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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we consider the problem of achieving uniform
and ergodic peer sampling in large scale dynamic systems
under adversarial behaviors. The main challenge is to guar-
antee that any honest node is able to construct a uniform
and non-fixed (ergodic) sample of the node identifiers in the
system, and this, despite the presence of malicious nodes
controlled by an adversary. This sample is built out of a
stream of events received at each node. We consider and
study two types of adversary: an omniscient adversary that
has the capacity to eavesdrop all the messages that are ex-
changed within the system, and a blind adversary that can
only observe messages that have been sent or received by the
manipulated nodes. The former model allows us to derive
lower bounds on the impact that the adversary has on the
sampling functionality while the latter one corresponds to a
realistic model. Given any sampling strategy, we quantify
the minimum effort exerted by both types of adversary on
any input stream to prevent this strategy from outputting a
uniform and ergodic sample.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.2.2 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms
and Problem Complexity—Non-numerical Algorithms and
Problems
General Terms
Theory, Algorithms
1. INTRODUCTION
We investigate the problem of achieving uniform and er-
godic peer sampling in large scale open systems in presence
of adversarial nodes. Uniform sampling is a fundamental
primitive ensuring that any individual in a population has
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the same probability to be selected as sample. Uniform sam-
pling finds its root in many practical problems such as data
collection, data dissemination, event driven communication,
load balancing and data-caching [6, 12, 14, 17]. In particu-
lar, publish-subscribe systems require that each subscriber
of any given topic has the same probability to be chosen as
access point for that topic, even in case some topics are more
popular than others [5]. Having access to a peer sampling
service provides such systems with uniform samples of nodes.
In the context of event-driven interaction systems, popula-
tion protocols rely on uniform node sampling as a basis for
the construction of fair schedulers [6]. Achieving uniform
sampling in large scale open and dynamic systems has been
shown to be difficult. One of the reasons is that the popula-
tion of these systems is very large (e.g., thousands or millions
of nodes) and exhibits a very high churn (recent studies on
the eDonkey file-sharing network have shown that in average
500, 000 peers connect and disconnect per day [15]). More-
over, openness makes unavoidable the presence of malicious
nodes that try to subvert the system functionalities. Most
common attacks mainly consist in isolating targeted hon-
est nodes from the remaining of the system so that sought
resources and/or services become unreachable (denial of ser-
vices attacks), and thus to the eventual partitioning of the
system.
By relying on the topological properties of structured large
scale dynamic systems, it has been shown that it is possible
to guarantee that with high probability the identifier of any
node is equally likely to appear in the local view of each
other honest node in a number of communication rounds
polynomial in the size of the system. One way to achieve
this is by imposing nodes to frequently depart from their
position and move to another random position in the sys-
tem [2, 4]. In unstructured large scale systems, nodes cannot
rely on the topological nature of structured graphs to detect
undesirable behaviors. To circumvent this issue, Bortnikov
et al. [7] rely on the properties of min-wise independent per-
mutations. Such permutations are fed by the streams of
gossiped nodes identifiers and eventually converge towards
a uniform sampling on the node identifiers. However, this
sample is definitive in the sense that no other node identifier
received in the future in the input stream will ever have the
chance to appear in the random sample. This makes this
sampling strategy uniform but not ergodic, that is, it does
not guarantee that the identifier of any node in the system
has a non-zero probability to appear infinitely often in a
sample. This clearly makes such an approach unfitted for
dynamic systems.
A preliminary step in determining conditions under which
uniform and ergodic sampling is achievable in unstructured
peer-to-peer systems potentially populated with a large pro-
portion of malicious nodes has been presented in a previous
paper [3]. Briefly, we show in [3] that imposing strict restric-
tions on the number of messages sent by malicious nodes
during a given period of time and providing each honest
node with a very large memory (proportional to the size of
the system) is a necessary and sufficient condition to obtain
uniform and ergodic sampling.
In the present paper, we propose a characterization of the
adversarial power towards biasing uniform and ergodic sam-
pling. By adopting a statistical view of the input stream
and by comparing distributions using metrics such as infor-
mation divergence, we derive lower bounds on the work that
the adversary has to exert to bias this input stream so that
uniform and ergodic sampling does not hold. We consider
and study two models of adversary: the omniscient adver-
sary, which has the capacity to eavesdrop on all the messages
that are exchanged within the system, and the blind adver-
sary, which can only observe messages that have been sent or
received by malicious nodes. To the best of our knowledge,
we are not aware of any previous work that has characterized
the minimum effort an adversary has to exert to prevent the
uniform and ergodic sampling to be achievable.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we
give an overview of the existing related work. Section 3 de-
scribes the model of the system and the assumptions that
are made. In Section 4, we describe the functionalities of a
sampling component and the properties that it should guar-
antee while in Section 5, we present some background on in-
formation divergence of data streams. The omniscient and
blind adversary models, as well as the characterization of
the minimum effort the adversary has to exert to bias the
sampling properties, are respectively studied in Sections 6
and 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes with some open issues.
2. RELATEDWORK
Different approaches have been proposed to deal with ma-
licious behaviors in the peer sampling problem in unstruc-
tured large scale dynamic systems. Jesi et al. [13] propose
a random sampling algorithm taking explicitly into account
malicious nodes. Their solution assumes that the ultimate
goal of the malicious nodes is to mutate the random graph
into a hub-based graph, hub for which malicious nodes gain
the lead. This approach, also adopted in several structured
based systems [21] through auditing mechanisms, or in sen-
sor networks [16], is effective only if the number of malicious
nodes is very small with respect to the size of the system
(i.e., typically of O(logn)). Bortnikov et al. [7] have re-
cently proposed a uniform but non-ergodic peer sampling
algorithm that tolerates up to a linear number of malicious
nodes. Their sampling mechanism exploits the properties of-
fered by min-wise permutations. Specifically, the sampling
component is fed with the stream of node identifiers peri-
odically gossiped by nodes, and outputs the node identifier
whose image value under the randomly chosen permutation
is the smallest value ever encountered. Thus eventually, by
the property of min-wise permutation, the sampler converges
towards a random but permanent sample. In a previous
work [3], the authors show that imposing strict restrictions
on the number of messages sent by malicious nodes during
a given period of time and providing each honest node with
a very large memory (proportional to the size of the sys-
tem) are necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain uni-
form and ergodic (non permanent) sampling. It is worth
noting that our results complement two previous results [8,
11], in which an analysis of the class of uniform and ergodic
sampling protocols is presented. Both previous work pro-
vide a complete analytical proof of a gossip-based protocol
that reaches both uniformity and ergodicity, but in contrast
to the present work, adversarial behaviors were not consid-
ered. Finally, taking a completely different approach from
the previously mentioned papers, which are based on gos-
sip algorithms or on distance function properties, the tech-
niques presented in [22, 23] rely on social network topologies
to guard against Sybil attacks. Both protocols take advan-
tage of the fact that Sybil attacks try to alter the fast mixing
property of social networks to defend against these attacks.
3. SYSTEMMODEL
Model of the Network. We consider a dynamic sys-
tem populated by a large collection of nodes in which each
node is assigned a unique and permanent random identi-
fier from an m-bit identifier space. Node identifiers (simply
denoted ids in the following) are derived by applying some
standard strong cryptographic hash function on nodes in-
trinsic characteristics. The value of m (160 for the standard
SHA-1 hash function) is chosen to be large enough to make
the probability of identifiers collision negligible. The sys-
tem is subject to churn, which is classically defined as the
rate of turnover of nodes in the system [10]. Each node
knows only a small set of nodes existing within the system
and this knowledge generally varies according to the activ-
ity of the system. The particular algorithm used by nodes
to update this small set and to route messages induces the
resulting overlay topology. In this work, we consider only
unstructured overlays. Unstructured overlays are assumed
to conform with random graphs, in the sense that relation-
ships among nodes are mostly set according to a random
process.
Adversary. We assume the presence of malicious nodes
that try to manipulate the system by exhibiting undesirable
behaviors (a node that is not malicious is called honest). In
our context, this amounts to dropping messages that should
normally be relayed by malicious nodes towards honest ones,
and injecting new messages. Injecting new messages does
not mean that malicious nodes have the ability to imperson-
ate honest nodes. Rather, their goal is to judiciously increase
the frequency of chosen ids to bias the sample list main-
tained by nodes. We model malicious behaviors through
an adversary that fully controls these malicious nodes. The
adversary model we considered follows the lines of [7, 13,
18], however we distinguish between two types of adversary:
the omniscient adversary that is able to eavesdrop all mes-
sages exchanged within the system, and the blind adversary
that can only observe messages sent or received by malicious
nodes. In both models, we assume that the adversary can
neither drop a message exchanged between two honest nodes
nor tamper with its content without being detected. This
is achieved by assuming the existence of a signature scheme
(and the corresponding public-key infrastructure) ensuring
the authenticity and integrity of messages.
ids stream S  (t)usSus
Γ u
Figure 1: Sampling component of node u ∈ N .
Sampling Assumptions. Similarly to Bortnikov et al. [7],
we assume that there exists a time T0 such that after that
time, the churn of the system ceases. This assumption is
necessary to make the notion of uniform sample meaning-
ful. Thus from T0 onwards, the population of the system S
is composed of n  2m nodes, such that at least (1 − k)n
of them are honest and no more than kn of them are mali-
cious, and thus are controlled by the adversary. The subset
of honest nodes in the overlay is denoted by N . Finally, we
assume that all the nodes in S are weakly connected from
time T0 onwards, which means that there exists a path be-
tween any pair of nodes in S in the underlying undirected
graph whose vertices represent the nodes of S and edges are
the communication links between these nodes.
4. SAMPLING COMPONENT
Following the approach taken in [3], each node u ∈ N has
locally access to a sampling component1 as presented in Fig-
ure 1. The sampling component implements a strategy s and
has uniquely access to a data structure Γu, referred to as the
sampling memory. The size of the sampling memory Γu is
bounded and is denoted by |Γu|. The sampling component
Ssu is fed with an infinite stream < vi, vj , . . . > of (possi-
bly non unique) node ids that correspond to the node ids
periodically received by node u ∈ N . This stream results ei-
ther from the propagation of node ids through gossip-based
algorithms (namely through push, or pull or push-pull mech-
anisms initiated by u and its neighbors), or from the node
ids received during random walks initiated at u, or even
from induced churn. The fingerprint of an input stream
is a collection of weighted points in which each node id is
weighted by the number of times this node id appears in the
stream. Specifically, a stream of node ids can be summa-
rized by < (v1,m1), . . . , (vn,mn) >, where vi denotes the
identifier of a node in S and mi ∈ N represents the number
of times vi appears in the stream. At each time t, the fol-
lowing three steps are atomically executed: the first element
of the stream, say node id v, is given as input to the sam-
pling component. The sampling component Ssu reads v, and
removes it from the stream. According to its strategy s, Ssu
may store or not v in Γu and outputs at most one node id.
For example, the strategy s may consist in storing v if
Γu is not full, or in substituting v for a randomly chosen
node id that belongs to Γu, or in simply dropping v. The
output at time t, denoted Ssu(t), is chosen among the node
ids in Γu according to strategy s. For instance, strategy s
may consist in choosing the smallest node id in Γu, or the
smallest node id under a given min-wise permutation [7].
The maximum finite hitting time needed for the sampling
1Although malicious nodes have also access to a sampling
component, we cannot impose any assumptions on how they
feed it or use it as their behavior can be totally arbitrary.
component Ssu to reach a uniform sample is denoted by Ts.
Clearly, Ts depends on the strategy s implemented by the
sampling component and also on the stream of node ids the
sampling component is fed with. We assume that the sam-
pling strategy is known by the adversary in the sense that
the algorithm used is public knowledge. However, if the al-
gorithm is a randomized one, the adversary does not have
access to the local random coins used by the honest nodes.
Finally, δ represents the number of node ids injected by
the adversary in the input stream of node u during the time
interval Ts. Note that it does not matter whether the in-
jected node ids correspond to the node ids of malicious nodes
or not as the unique goal of the adversary is to bias the in-
put stream in such a way that whatever the strategy s of
the sampler component, its output Ssu(t) cannot guarantee
both the uniform and ergodic properties [3]. More precisely,
these properties are defined as follows
Property 4.1 (Uniformity). Let N be a weakly con-
nected graph from time T0 onwards, then for any time t ≥
Ts, for any node v ∈ S, and for any node u ∈ N ,
Pr[v ∈ Ssu(t)] = 1|S| .
Property 4.2 (Ergodicity). Let N be a weakly con-
nected graph from time T0 onwards, then for any time t ≥
Ts, for any node v ∈ S, and for any node u ∈ N ,
Pr
[{t′|t′ > t ∧ v ∈ Ssu(t′)} = ∅] = 0,
where ∅ represents the empty set.
Uniformity states that for any node in the system, its
node id should have the same probability to appear in the
sample of honest nodes in the system, while ergodicity says
that any node id should have a non-zero probability to ap-
pear infinitely often in the sample of each honest node in
the system. Note that uniformity by itself does not imply
ergodicity, and vice versa. Indeed, the former does not im-
pose any restriction on the freshness of output node ids,
while the latter one does not provide any guarantee regard-
ing the equiprobability of node ids to be chosen as samples.
Moreover, as each node v in S has a non-zero probability
to be returned by Ssu(t) at time t, v must appear at least
once in the input stream. Thus, ∀v ∈ S, starting from time
Ts, mv > 0. Note that as previously said the model and
analysis presented in this paper are independent from the
way the stream of node ids at each node u is generated.
5. INFORMATIONDIVERGENCEOFDATA
STREAMS
A natural approach to detect changes on data streams is
to model it as a distribution and to compute the distance be-
tween the observed stream and the ideal one. The metric we
use in our context is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence.
It is sometimes called the relative entropy [9].
Definition 5.1 (Kullback-Leibler divergence).
Given two probability distributions on events p = {p1, . . . , pn}
and q = {q1, . . . , qn}, the Kullback-Leibler divergence be-
tween pi relative to qi is defined as the expected value of
the likelihood ratio with respect to qi. Specifically,
D(p||q) =
n∑
i=1
pi log2
pi
qi
= H(p, q)−H(p), (1)
where H(p) = −∑ pi log2 pi is the (Shannon) entropy of p
and H(p, q) = −∑ pi log2 qi is the cross entropy of p and q
(by convention, 0 log2 0 = 0).
The KL-divergence is a member of a larger class of dis-
tances known as the Ali-Silvey distances [1]. For the sake of
clarity, we will use the notation log to denote the logarithm
in base 2. Let p(U) be the uniform distribution correspond-
ing to a uniform stream, i.e., ∀i ∈ [1. . n], p(U)i = 1n , and q
be the probability distribution corresponding to the input
stream. In the rest of this paper and according to the clas-
sical use of the KL-divergence, we consider D(q||p(U)) as a
measure of the divergence of the stream from the ideal one.
Definition 5.2 (τ -closeness). A stream of node ids
σ is τ -close if the KL-divergence between the probability dis-
tribution q corresponding to σ and the uniform probability
distribution p(U) is below or equal to a given value τ , where
τ is a real. In the sequel, τ is called the robustness threshold.
Finally, given two distributions of probability, the Earth
Mover’s Distance (EMD) [20] measures the minimal amount
of work needed to transform one distribution to another by
moving the probability mass between events. We rely on
this metric to quantify the effort that an adversary exerts
to bias the input stream. In our context, a unit of work
corresponds to dropping one id and to pushing another id
instead in the input stream.
6. OMNISCIENT ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section, we study the behavior of an omniscient
adversary, which has the capacity to eavesdrop on all the
messages sent and received by all the nodes in S. We demon-
strate that the strategy that pushes all the probability mass
over a single id is the one that maximizes the bias of the
input stream so that it becomes far from the uniform dis-
tribution. We also describe an optimal strategy on how to
achieve it.
In the following, the analysis of infinite input stream is
restricted to any window of length Ts observed from time t ≥
T0. As previously said, Ts depends on the sampler strategy,
and thus can be arbitrarily large. By abuse of language, the
term “stream” will thus denote in the remaining of the paper
the stream restricted to any such window of length Ts. The
notation [1. . n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Let σ be a stream such that the id of each node in S
appears exactly once in the stream, except for a unique id
that appears in all the remaining slots. Therefore, there
exists a unique vi ∈ S such that mvi = Ts−(n−1) and ∀vj 6=
vi ∈ S,mvj = 1. The following theorem states that the
probability distribution associated to this particular stream
is the one that has the maximal divergence from the uniform
distribution.
Theorem 6.1. (Maximal divergence from the uni-
form distribution)
Let p(U) be the uniform distribution corresponding to a uni-
form stream, that is, ∀i ∈ [1. . n], p(U)i = 1n , and q be the prob-
ability distribution corresponding to σ, i.e., it exists a unique
vi ∈ S, qvi =
Ts−(n−1)
Ts
and ∀vj ∈ S, vj 6= vi ⇒ qvj = 1Ts .
Then, for any possible probability distribution q,
D(q||p(U)) ≤ D(q||p(U)).
Proof. Let q be the probability distribution representing
any valid input stream on (T0, Ts]. We have ∀vi ∈ S, qvi =mvi
Ts
, where mvi is the number of times vi is present in the
input stream. We have
D(q||p(U)) = H(q, p(U))−H(q)
= −
n∑
i=1
qi log
(
p
(U)
i
)
−H(q) = log(n)−H(q).
Therefore, maximizing D(q||p(U)) amounts to minimizing
H(q), which is equivalent to maximize
∑n
i=1mvi log
(
mvi
Ts
)
.
We characterize the stream that minimizes H(q) under the
following constraints:
1 ≤ mvi ≤ Ts with 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n∑
i=1
mvi = Ts.
(2)
From this set of constraints, we immediately have 1 ≤ mvi ≤
Ts − (n − 1). To relax the second constraint, we consider
mvn = Ts −
n−1∑
i=1
mvi . Let function f be such that
f(mv1 , . . . ,mvn−1) =
n−1∑
i=1
mvi log
(
mvi
Ts
)
+
(
Ts −
n−1∑
i=1
mvi
)
log
(
1−
n−1∑
i=1
mvi
Ts
)
.
Function f is differentiable on its domain Is = [1. . Ts−n+
1]n−1, thus we get
df
dmvj
(mv1 , . . . ,mvn−1) = log
(
mvj
Ts
)
+mvj
Ts
mvj
+ log
(
1−
n−1∑
i=1
mvi
Ts
)
+
Ts −∑n−1i=1 mvi
1−∑n−1i=1 mviTs
= log
(
mvj
)
+ log
(
Ts −
n−1∑
i=1
mvj
)
+ 2(Ts − log(Ts)).
According to Equation 2, we have
log
(
mvj
)
+ log
(
Ts −
n−1∑
i=1
mvj
)
≥ 0
and, as Ts  1, this implies Ts − log(Ts) > 0. Then, we
obtain that df
dmvj
> 0, leading to the fact that f is strictly
increasing according to mvj . The maximum is then reach
for mvj = Ts − n+ 1 (f is a Schur-convex function).
From the set of constraints (cf. Equation 2), if the max-
imum of D(q||p(U)) is reached for mvj = Ts − n + 1 then∑n
i=1,i 6=jmvi = n−1 implies that ∀i ∈ [1..n], i 6= j,mvi = 1,
which concludes the proof.
This allows us to formulate an upper-bound Dmax on the
KL-divergence between the uniform stream and any other
stream:
Dmax = D(q||p(U))
= log(n) + log(Ts)−
(
1− n− 1
Ts
)
log (Ts − n+ 1) . (3)
Thus any input stream σ is Dmax-close (cf. Definition 5.2).
To determine the minimal effort that the adversary has to
exert to bias the input stream so that both uniformity and
ergodicity properties do not hold, we use the Earth Mover’s
Distance (EMD) between the uniform distribution and the
target one. In the following, when we say that the adversary
replaces node id vi by node id vj , we mean that he drops vi
from the input stream and injects vj instead. Recall that the
adversary is able to drop and inject node ids only from the
nodes it controls. However, as motivated in the introduction,
the adversary may succeed in surrounding a honest node
with malicious nodes so that it may shape by itself the input
stream of this honest node.
Lemma 6.2. (Optimal strategy to maximize the di-
vergence)
Given an input stream σ, replacing the less frequent node
id in σ with the most frequent one maximizes the gain in
KL-divergence with respect to the uniform distribution for
the same amount of work as measured by the EMD distance.
Proof. Given an input stream σ represented by the prob-
ability distribution q, we construct the input stream σ′ from
σ by substituting one occurrence of node id vi with node id
vj so that D(q′||p(U)) is maximized after this replacement
(where q′ denote the probability distribution representing
σ′). This amounts to maximizing
[
D(q′||p(U))−D(q||p(U))
]
.
Recall that all node ids in S must be present in σ′. There-
fore, we search for the node id pair (vi, vj) such that
m′vj = mvj + 1
m′vi = mvi − 1
vj = arg maxvj∈S
(
q′vj log
(
q′vj
)
− qvj log
(
qvj
))
vi = arg maxvi∈S
(
q′vi log
(
q′vi
)− qvi log (qvi))
Consider the function f : x 7→ x log(x), which is strictly
increasing. As for any k ∈ S, qvk = mvk/Ts, we have: vj = arg maxvj∈S
(
f
(
mvj+1
Ts
)
− f
(
mvj
Ts
))
vi = arg maxvi∈S
(
f
(
mvi−1
Ts
)
− f
(
mvi
Ts
))
=⇒
{
vj = arg maxvj∈S mvj
vi = arg minvi∈S mvi
This leads from the fact that the function g1 : x 7→ f(x+1Ts )−
f( x
Ts
) (respectively g2 : x 7→ f(x−1Ts ) − f( xTs )) is strictly in-
creasing (respectively strictly decreasing). Thus the optimal
node id replacement that maximizes the KL-divergence gain
is obtained by replacing the less frequent node id vi with the
most frequent one vj .
Algorithm 1 shows an optimal implementation of Lemma 6.2
with respect to the number of performed replacements. This
algorithm is run by the adversary. Specifically, the inputs
of the algorithm are τs and an input stream σ that feeds
the sampler component Ssu of some honest node u. Recall
that τs is the robustness threshold of the sampling strat-
egy s implemented by Ssu, i.e., for any τs-close input stream
σ, the sampling strategy s is able to output a uniform and
ergodic sample. The goal of the greedy Algorithm 1 is to
tamper with the input stream σ in order to increase its KL-
divergence above τs with a minimum effort.
Algorithm 1: Adversary biasing strategy
Data: an input stream σ, the robustness threshold τs
Result: the number of replacements ` if it exists
1 if τs ≥ Dmax then
2 return “fail”
3 else
4 `← 0;
5 vj ← arg maxvj∈S mvj ;
6 while
(
D(qσ||p(U)) ≤ τs
)
do
7 vi ← arg min{v∈S:mvi 6=1}mvi ;
8 let k be the index of an item in the part of the
stream controlled by an adversary such that
σ[k] = vi ;
9 σ[k]← vj //one occurrence of vi is dropped
and vj is injected instead ;
10 `← `+ 1;
11 return `
By assumption, the adversary is omniscient and therefore
has the capacity to observe the entire input stream σ. From
Section 4, the adversary knows the strategy s of the sampler,
and thus can compute the value of τs. The value of the max-
imum divergence Dmax is computed using Relation (3). If
Dmax is larger than or equal to the robustness threshold, the
algorithm returns“fail”. Otherwise at each iteration, the ad-
versary performs the optimal node id replacement until the
KL-divergence exceeds the robustness threshold. Remember
however, that the adversary cannot drop messages that have
been sent or forwarded by nodes it does not control (i.e. the
honest ones). Note that at lines (8) and (9) of Algorithm 1
both mvi and mvj are updated. Counter ` returned by Al-
gorithm 1 represents the number of replacements done by
the adversary.
Consider a sampling strategy s, its robustness threshold
τs, and an input stream σ. Let ` be the number of replace-
ments executed in Algorithm 1. If we denote by qσ(`) the
probability distribution derived from σ after these ` optimal
replacements, then we have
Corollary 6.3. (Lower bound on the effort ex-
erted by an omniscient adversary)
The minimum number of replacements an omniscient adver-
sary has to apply to exceed τs is
δ = inf
{
` ∈ N : D(qσ(`)||p(U)) > τs
}
. (4)
7. BLIND ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section, we study the behavior of a blind adversary,
that is an adversary that only has the capacity to observe
messages sent or received by the nodes he controls. A strat-
egy that the adversary might apply to bias the input stream
is to choose a node id (possibly one that belongs to a mali-
cious node but not necessarily) and to push it in the input
stream as much as possible. We show that this strategy
is optimal with respect to the effort exerted by the adver-
sary and we give the lower bound on the expected minimum
amount of work a blind adversary has to exert to bias the
input stream.
Theorem 7.1. (Lower bound on the expected effort
exerted by a blind adversary)
Let s be a sampling strategy, τs its robustness threshold and
Ts the maximum convergence time of s. The minimum num-
ber of replacements a blind adversary has to apply in expec-
tation to exceed τs is given when the input stream is the
uniform one. We have
δ˜ = inf {` ∈ Is : R` > τs} (5)
where Is =
[
0..Ts − n+ 1−
⌊
Ts
n
⌋]
and
R` = 1
n
(⌊
`− 1⌊
Ts
n
− 1⌋
⌋
log
(
Ts
n
)
+ log
(
T 2s
Ts + n`
)
− log
(
Ts − n
(
1 + (`− 1) mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋)))
Proof. Let us consider the uniform node ids stream on
a window of length Ts. For any vi ∈ S, vi is present in the
stream Ts/n in average. Thus the probability distribution
p(U) is such that ∀vi ∈ S, p(U)vi = 1/n. From Section 6,
we have seen that the optimal strategy for the adversary to
bias an input stream is to replace the less frequent node id
in this stream with the most frequent one. By assumption,
the adversary is blind and cannot observe all the node ids of
the input stream. Thus the strategy the adversary applies
consists in choosing a specific node id vj and repeatedly
pushes vj in the input stream. Let σ be an input stream
and σ′ be the stream obtained from σ after one step of this
adversarial strategy (i.e., replacing vi by vj for some vi ∈ S).
We have
D(qσ′ ||p(U))−D(qσ||p(U))
=
1
n
(
log
(
mvj
mvj + 1
)
+ log
(
mvi
mvi − 1
))
, (6)
where qσ and qσ′ represent respectively the probability dis-
tributions of σ and σ′. In the following, qσ(`) denotes the
probability distribution derived from σ after ` replacements.
Given a sampling strategy s, we prove by induction on the
number of optimal replacements ` that, starting from a uni-
form stream, the maximum KL-divergence after ` replace-
ments is given by D(qσ(`)||p(U)) = R` where
R` = 1
n
(⌊
`− 1⌊
Ts
n
− 1⌋
⌋
log
(
Ts
n
)
+ log
(
T 2s
Ts + n`
)
(7)
− log
(
Ts − n
(
1 + (`− 1) mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋)))
Note that ` cannot be greater than
(
Ts − n+ 1−
⌊
Ts
n
⌋)
.
Indeed, all node ids in the initial uniform stream are present
at least
⌊
Ts
n
⌋
times and the maximum number of times a
unique id can appear in the stream is (Ts − n+ 1).
For ` = 1, the claim immediately holds from Equation 6.
Now, assume that the claim also holds for all 1 ≤ k ≤ `. We
show that the claim holds for k = `+ 1. The KL-divergence
with respect to the uniform stream after `+ 1 steps is
D(qσ(`+1)||p(U)) =
D(qσ(`)||p(U)) +D(qσ(`+1)||p(U))−D(qσ(`)||p(U)). (8)
The term D(qσ(`+1)||p(U)) − D(qσ(`)||p(U)) represents the
gain of step (`+1), and D(qσ(`)||p(U)) is given by Equation 7.
Two sub-cases need to be considered: (i) ` mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1⌋ 6=
0 and (ii) ` mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1⌋ = 0.
Case (i): the less frequent node id vi in the stream at step
`+1 is the same as the one removed at step `. After ` steps,
mvj =
Ts
n
+ ` and mvi =
Ts
n
− (1 + (`− 1) mod ⌊Ts
n
− 1⌋),
thus the right part of Equation 6 is equal to
1
n
(
log
(
Ts
n
+ `
Ts
n
+ `+ 1
)
+ log
(
Ts
n
− (1 + (`− 1) mod ⌊Ts
n
− 1⌋)
Ts
n
− (1 + (`− 1) mod ⌊Ts
n
− 1⌋)− 1
))
=
1
n
(
log
(
Ts − n
(
1 + (`− 1) mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋))
+ log (Ts + n`)− log (Ts + n(`+ 1))
− log
(
Ts − n
(
2 + (`− 1) mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋)))
.
By assumption (i), we have
⌊
`−1
bTsn −1c
⌋
=
⌊
`
bTsn −1c
⌋
and(
1 + (`− 1) mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋)
=
(
` mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋)
.
From Equation 8, we get D(qσ(`+1)||p(U)) =
=
1
n
(⌊
`⌊
Ts
n
− 1⌋
⌋
log
(
Ts
n
)
+ log
(
T 2s
Ts + n(`+ 1)
)
− log
(
Ts − n
(
1 + ` mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋)))
,
which ends Case (i).
Case (ii). The argumentation is the same as above. How-
ever, as ` mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1⌋ = 0, the node id that has been pre-
viously replaced is now present exactly once in the stream.
Thus the adversary needs to randomly choose another node
id in the stream before processing the next step of his strat-
egy. Thus applying Equation 6 at step `+ 1 gives
D(qσ(`+1)||p(U))−D(qσ(`)||p(U)) =
1
n
(
log
(
Ts
n
+ `
Ts
n
+ `+ 1
)
+ log
(
Ts
n
Ts
n
− 1
))
. (9)
By assumption
(
(`− 1) mod ⌊Ts
n
− 1⌋ = ⌊Ts
n
− 1⌋− 1), and
by combining the induction hypothesis 7 with the gain ob-
tained at step `+ 1 (Equation 9), we get D(qσ(`+1)||p(U)) =
1
n
(⌊
`− 1⌊
Ts
n
− 1⌋
⌋
log
(
Ts
n
)
+ 3 log (Ts)
− log (Ts + n(`+ 1))− log (Ts − n)− log (n)) .
By assumption of the case :
⌊
`
bTsn −1c
⌋
=
⌊
`−1
bTsn −1c
⌋
+ 1,
which proves the induction: D(qσ(`+1)||p(U)) =
=
1
n
(⌊
`⌊
Ts
n
− 1⌋
⌋
log
(
Ts
n
)
+ log
(
T 2s
Ts + n(`+ 1)
)
− log
(
Ts − n
(
1 + ` mod
⌊
Ts
n
− 1
⌋)))
.
As a conclusion, any value of ` that allows the adversary
to exceed the robustness threshold τs defeats the sampling
strategy. Thus, the minimum number of replacement oper-
ations δ˜ is the lower bound of this set of values.
We now evaluate the minimum amount of work a blind
adversary has to exert, in the worst case, to bias the input
stream. In the worst case, the node id vi the adversary has
chosen to blindly flood might be initially present only once
in the input stream. In order to bias the input stream, the
adversary needs to push id vi sufficiently often so that the
probability of appearance of id vi reaches the uniform value,
with respect to all the other node ids, and then to continue
to push this id δ˜ times so that the divergence between the
resulting stream and the uniform one is maximum.
Theorem 7.2. (Lower bound on the effort exerted
by a blind adversary)
Let s be a sampling strategy, τs its robustness threshold and
Ts the maximum convergence time of s. The minimum num-
ber of replacements the adversary has to apply on a stream,
in the worst case, to exceed τs is
δ˜ +
⌈
Ts
n
⌉
− 1.
Proof. The proof is immediate. First, the adversary has
to raise the chosen id at least up to the uniform value. As
in the worst case, this id is present only once in the initial
stream, this costs
⌈
Ts
n
⌉ − 1 replacements to reach a num-
ber of occurrences equals to
⌈
Ts
n
⌉
. Moreover, once this id
is present in the modified stream
⌈
Ts
n
⌉
times, the adversary
follows the same strategy as before, which requires δ˜ more
steps to guarantee that the robustness threshold τs is ex-
ceeded. Note that this value is a worst-case bound and not
the exact minimum value with respect to τs because after the
first (
⌈
Ts
n
⌉−1) steps, the modified stream could be different
from the uniform one. In this situation, the KL-divergence
to the uniform stream is strictly greater than 0, reducing
accordingly the amount of work of the adversary to exceed
τs.
8. CONCLUSION AND OPEN ISSUES
In this paper, we have focused on the problem of achiev-
ing uniform and ergodic peer sampling in large scale open
systems potentially populated with malicious peers. This
problem consists in guaranteeing that the knowledge of the
system maintained by each honest peer is a uniform and non
permanent sample of the whole population of the system.
By modeling input streams as probability distributions, we
have characterized the minimum effort (measured in terms
of node ids replacements) that an omniscient and a blind
adversary have to exert on the input stream of node identi-
fiers to exceed the robustness threshold that quantifies the
power of a sampling strategy. Similarly to (pseudo)-random
number generators that are considered as the basic mathe-
matical tool to generate complex probability distributions,
we believe that uniform peer sampling should be regarded
as a necessary building block to derive larger classes of sam-
pling schemes. This building block is of utmost importance
in systems in which the population is continuously evolving
τ
¬E E
Figure 2: Characterization of Sampling Strategies
and thus, where it is impossible to capture the full complex-
ity of the network through global snapshots.
We conjecture that there exists a total order relationship
on the power of (non-)ergodic uniform sampling strategies
with respect to their robustness threshold τ . This can be
depicted by using a planar representation as shown by Fig-
ure 2. Each τ -radius circle in this picture represents the
class of τ -close uniform sampling strategies. For instance,
in this representation the strategy proposed by Bortnikov et
al. [7] belongs to the largest circle corresponding to τ = ∞
on its non ergodic part (left side). As another illustrative
example, the sampling strategy proposed in Busnel et al. [8]
should be ranked as less powerful than the one proposed by
Gurevich et al. [11] since the latter one achieves uniform and
ergodic sampling despite message loss contrary to the for-
mer one. Both strategies would appear in the ergodic part
of the representation (right side). Finally, we think that
this classification can be used as a tool to precisely compare
any two sampling strategies as different as they are (e.g., [4]
and [19]). As future work, we intend to rank the state-the-
art sampling algorithms in the light of this new framework.
Moreover, we plan to extend this work by integrating other
dimensions, such as space and time resources, and determin-
istic versus probabilistic strategies.
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